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Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to 
Combat This Critical National Security Concern 
Daniel Pines* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 7:15 a.m. on April 8, 2009, four pirates in a fast-
moving skiff used grappling irons and a torrent of firepower to board an 
unarmed 508-foot U.S.-flagged vessel, the Maersk Alabama.1 The Ala-
bama was traversing the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Somalia, in 
order to provide food aid to Kenya.2 The attack marked the first time that 
pirates had boarded an American merchant vessel since the early 1800s.3 
Once the pirates were on the vessel, the Alabama’s captain and three 
other sailors distracted the armed pirates on deck, while the rest of the 
crew disabled the ship and then hid in safe rooms below.4 With the pi-
rate’s skiff having been sunk during the melee, and the Alabama com-
pletely inoperable, the Alabama’s captain convinced the pirates to retreat 
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into the Alabama’s lifeboat.5 The pirates took the captain as their prison-
er, hoping to ransom him for a reported $2–3 million.6 
Events did not work out as the pirates had hoped. A U.S. destroyer 
trailed the lifeboat while negotiations for the captain’s release dragged 
on.7 After five days of futile discussions, the United States came to the 
conclusion that the pirates intended imminent harm to the captain. Deep-
ly concerned for the captain’s safety, and operating pursuant to authority 
provided by President Obama, the U.S. destroyer slowly came alongside 
the lifeboat.8 On board the destroyer were three snipers from Navy Seal 
Team 6, one of America’s top military operations units that would sub-
sequently lead the successful raid of Osama Bin Laden’s compound in 
Pakistan.9 The three snipers, calibrating the rollicking of both the de-
stroyer and the lifeboat, simultaneously fired one shot each, killing the 
three pirates aboard the lifeboat.10 The captain, amazingly, was unhurt in 
the exchange.11 The fourth pirate, who had earlier surrendered to U.S. 
authorities, was brought to the United States to stand trial on counts of 
piracy, hijacking, hostage taking, kidnapping, and conspiracy.12 Pleading 
guilty to all counts except the count of piracy, this fourth pirate was sen-
tenced to more than thirty years in prison.13 
Ask most Americans to list the major national security concerns 
and the response inevitably will include issues such as terrorism, peace in 
the Middle East, and possibly even counter-proliferation and counter-
narcotics. Unlikely to make the list, however, is maritime piracy. Those 
familiar with the problem of maritime piracy, including most authors 
who have written on the subject, typically categorize it as a law enforce-
ment matter that impacts a small number of mostly non-Americans.14 
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Some go so far as to consider it a regional political concern primarily 
impacting Somalia and other nations in the Gulf of Aden, or perhaps a 
minor international economic problem, given its impact on the global 
transportation of goods.15 
While all of these descriptions may be accurate, the Alabama inci-
dent and others demonstrate that the true threat posed by piracy, especial-
ly for the United States, is to our national security. George F. Kennan 
famously defined the term “national security” in 1948 as “the continued 
ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference, 
or threat of interference, from foreign powers.”16 Under this definition, mar-
itime piracy poses a clear national security threat to the United States.17 
Piracy threatens, and has taken, the lives of American crews and ci-
vilians. It poses an enormous economic threat, both in terms of ransom 
payments and impact on global commerce. It enhances political instabil-
ity in significant regions of the world, such as the Horn of Africa and the 
Straits of Malacca. Most critically, though, maritime piracy offers an 
easy and tempting conduit for terrorism. Terrorists have already used 
maritime options to advance their cause in several dramatic attacks, in-
cluding the hijacking of a cruise ship (and murder of a Jewish passen-
ger), the ramming of a boat into a U.S. destroyer (killing seventeen U.S. 
sailors), and attacks on numerous other maritime vessels. Other pira-
terrorist attacks have been thwarted, while many more appear to be in the 
planning stages. Therefore, it is now time—indeed well past time—to 
consider piracy as the national security threat that it actually is. Aviation 
hijacking was not considered a significant national security concern until 
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al-Qaeda used hijacked airplanes to bring down buildings on 9/11. We 
cannot wait for a brutal terrorist attack at sea to occur before we realize 
the same risk that maritime piracy poses to our country. 
This Article therefore articulates what international and U.S. law 
authorizes the United States to do and precludes the United States from 
doing to combat the national security threat posed by piracy, including 
the ability of the United States to militarily attack pirates, seize their ves-
sels, prosecute them in the United States, and have them prosecuted out-
side the United States. It then provides suggestions as to how to augment 
these laws to better confront the threat. 
In so doing, this Article takes a different tack from the other law re-
view articles recently authored on the topic.18 Rather than concentrating 
on what the international community is or should be permitted to do to 
combat piracy, and rather than looking at the matter as a primarily eco-
nomic or regional geopolitical issue, this Article focuses on piracy as a 
U.S. national security matter and evaluates what U.S. statutes and regula-
tions can and should permit the United States to do with regard to this 
threat. 
To this end, Part II of this Article provides a background on piracy. 
It begins by offering a working definition for the often elusive term. It 
then proceeds to outline the history of piracy, before finally examining 
the current threat to national security that piracy poses. Part III then as-
sesses what international law permits the United States to do to combat 
piracy. As piracy is considered a “universal” crime impacting all nations, 
and as piracy typically takes place outside U.S. territorial waters, interna-
tional law plays a significant role in the American ability to thwart pirat-
ical attacks. Part IV then builds on the international law regime to de-
scribe the laws the United States currently has in place to use force 
against pirates. Part V continues the review of current law on piracy by 
evaluating the availability of the courts to prosecute pirates.  
Finally, Part VI offers more than a dozen concrete and viable pro-
posals for augmenting the U.S. ability to combat this national security 
scourge. Focusing on the need to deter piracy, as well as capture and 
prosecute those who engage in such acts, the suggested solutions include 
the following: passing legislation to allow for prosecution of those who 
materially assist pirates, as already exists in the fight against terrorism; 
expanding the rules of the International Criminal Court to allow for the 
inclusion of piracy claims; establishing bilateral agreements with various 
coastal nations to augment the ability of the United States to pursue pi-
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rates into other nations’ territorial waters; and revising current U.S. regu-
lations to better permit U.S. vessels to carry weapons and armed guards 
to combat pirate attacks. While these proposals appear to be simple 
and—hopefully by the end of this Article—obvious solutions to the prob-
lem, the United States nonetheless has yet to implement any of them 
even though they offer significant, pragmatic means to combat the threat 
in the immediate future. 
II. BACKGROUND ON PIRACY 
Anyone who has seen a recent Johnny Depp film has a clear sense 
of what constitutes a “pirate”: parrot on the shoulder, eye patch, bad ac-
cent, and a general disregard for bathing. Beyond this colloquial under-
standing, however, an examination of the elusive legal definition and 
long history of piracy is necessary to understand the national security 
threat now posed by piratical activities. 
A. Definition of Piracy 
As many commentators have noted, there is no universally accepted 
definition for the term “piracy.”19 A close evaluation of the scholarship 
and case law in this area, though, reveals three key facets of piracy, 
which together suggest an appropriate definition. 
First, there must be an intent to rob or plunder.20 Or, as U.S. courts 
have colorfully stated, there must be a “piratical or felonious intent, or 
for the purpose of wanton plunder, or malicious destruction of proper-
ty.”21 Thus, there is no piracy if the activity is due to “mistake, or in nec-
essary self-defence, or to repel a supposed meditated attack by pirates.”22 
Second, the act must take place at sea or in a seaport; otherwise, the mat-
ter involves merely a common robbery or burglary. Thus, the traditional 
definition of piracy, which combines these first two criteria, is “robbery, 
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or forcible depredations upon the sea,”23 with depredation defined as the 
“act of plundering, robbing or pillaging.”24 
This traditional definition, though benefitting from brevity, misses 
the third major component of piracy, namely, that it is performed by 
stateless actors.25 After all, if a ship operating under the flag or at the di-
rection of a sovereign nation robs or plunders another sovereign nation’s 
ship, such activity is not piracy, but more likely an act of war. 
Indeed, it is the statelessness of the act that makes piracy so repre-
hensible, as described by the Federal District Court of New York in 1885 
in the now-famous Ambrose Light case.26 As the court explained, all na-
tions are entitled to engage in maritime commerce in peace. Only a sov-
ereign can upset this passivity, either through the declaration of a lawful 
war or via the just restrictions such a sovereign chooses to impose on his 
or her territorial sea or port. Otherwise, anarchy ensues. Warfare on the 
water committed by stateless actors is therefore unlawful, and those who 
make such violent attacks against others have no legal rights, unless they 
are recognized as lawful belligerents. Of course, only a sovereign nation 
can recognize lawful belligerent status. Thus, the court forcefully con-
cluded: 
[I]n the absence of recognition by any government of their belliger-
ent rights, insurgents that send out vessels of war are, in legal con-
templation, merely combinations of private persons engaged in un-
lawful depredations on the high seas; that they are civilly and crimi-
nally responsible in the tribunals for all their acts of vio-
lence; . . . that such acts are therefore piratical, and entitle the ships 
and tribunals of every nation whose interests are attacked or men-
aced, to suppress, at their discretion, such unauthorized warfare by 
the seizure and confiscation of the vessels engaged in it. The right 
of seizure by other nations arises in such cases, ex necessitate, from 
the very nature of the case. There is no other remedy except open 
war; and nations are not required to declare war against individual 
rebels whom they are unwilling and are not required to recognize as 
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a belligerent power. . . . By the right of self-defense, they may simp-
ly seize such law-breakers as come in their way and menace them 
with injury. Without this right, insurgents, though recognition were 
rightly refused them, and however insignificant their cause, or un-
worthy their conduct, might violate the rights of all other nations, 
harass their commerce, and capture or sink their ships with impuni-
ty.27 
Putting these three components together, “piracy” as we shall use it 
in this Article is the act of seeking to rob, plunder, or engage in some 
other depredating act against a ship on the sea where the attackers are 
without authorization from or affiliation with any sovereign nation. The 
U.S. government and its courts have generally accepted a definition of 
piracy along these lines.28 
B. History of Piracy 
Piracy is considered the oldest recognized international crime,29 and 
it appears to have existed since humankind began adventuring into the 
sea. As one author stated, “[t]he very first time something valuable was 
known to be leaving a beach on a raft the first pirate was around to steal 
it.”30 Piracy was a significant issue in ancient Greece and Rome.31 In-
deed, a young Julius Caesar was allegedly captured by pirates in 78 B.C. 
and released only after a significant reward was paid to his captors.32 In-
terestingly, at its inception, piracy was not merely tolerated–early nations 
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often hired pirates to attack the state’s enemies.33 Some nations support-
ed certain types of pirates (known as “privateers”) to augment the na-
tion’s coffers because pirates in cahoots with a given government would 
split the proceeds of their booty with the crown.34 
The early history of the United States is replete with pirate attacks 
on U.S. vessels including the infamous attacks by Barbary pirates in the 
late 1700s.35 After peaking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
though, acts of piracy around the world and against the United States 
diminished so significantly that, by the middle of the twentieth century, 
piracy was considered almost completely eradicated.36 The 1964 edition 
of the Encyclopedia Britannica went so far as to declare that “[t]he end 
of piracy, after centuries, was brought about by public feeling, backed up 
by the steam engine and telegraph.”37 
Paraphrasing Mark Twain, however, the rumors of the death of pi-
racy were greatly exaggerated. After an outbreak of pirate attacks in the 
1970s and 1980s,38 the threat reached critical mass in the current millen-
nium and has grown worse in recent years. Indeed, 2010 was a record 
year, with 445 reported pirate attacks and fifty-three ships seized.39 The 
number of hostages taken by pirates rose from an estimated 188 in 2006 
to 1,181 in 2010.40 The numbers dropped only slightly in 2011, with 439 
reported attacks worldwide, which resulted in the seizure of forty-five 
vessels and 802 hostages.41 
The vast majority of recent pirate attacks have taken place in or 
around the territorial waters of Somalia, due to that nation’s impover-
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ished populace and long-time political instability.42 But Somalia is not 
the sole hotbed of piracy. Large numbers of attacks take place every year 
in the waters around Indonesia and Malaysia.43 Benin and Nigeria have 
recently become rife with piracy attacks.44 Other piratical attacks have 
been recorded in areas as diverse as Bangladesh and waters near Swe-
den.45 
There are numerous reasons for the recent increase in pirate attacks. 
Certainly, the poverty of some coastal populations is a tremendous con-
tributing factor.46 For example, in Somalia, piracy is considered one of 
the few money-making industries in that impoverished nation.47 A single 
seizure can earn a Somali pirate $150,000 in ransom,48 which is a truly 
staggering sum in a country with a per capita GDP of around $600.49 Not 
only do such large ransoms encourage piracy, but pirate organizations 
also use their illicit proceeds to acquire more sophisticated equipment to 
greater augment their likelihood of success and allow them to attack big-
ger and more valuable vessels, creating a vicious cycle. Thus, pirates 
now use satellite phones, GPS systems, and powerful weapons in their 
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attacks.50 They also often transform captured vessels of lower ransom 
value, such as fishing boats or cargo dhows,51 into “mother ships” from 
which they can launch attacks on more lucrative targets.52 
Combined with the large financial incentive of piracy, minimal en-
forcement creates a high benefit-to-risk scenario. Poverty-stricken coun-
tries, such as Somalia, have few resources to thwart piracy and little in-
centive to spend their limited finances on protecting commercial ships 
that are usually just passing by on the way to enhancing the financial in-
terests of other states.53 Such impoverished nations also tend to have in-
effective courts and prosecutors, and weak central governments that 
prove unable or unwilling to enact or enforce anti-piracy laws.54 In addi-
tion, most acts of piracy take place in international waters and therefore 
outside the jurisdiction of any one state. Thus, as one author has noted, 
“[a]s the oceans are used by all and controlled by no one, a regulatory 
vacuum exists with respect to laws guiding state responses to piratical 
acts.”55 
Nations that register and license ships, which are known as “flag 
states,” also often have limited interest or ability to deter piracy against 
their vessels.56 Until fairly recently, most ships operated under the flags 
of only a few, generally powerful, nations.57 Starting in the 1980s, how-
ever, several smaller nations noticed the financial benefit of being a flag 
state and became what are known as “flag-of-convenience” states.58 
While this has led to a general decrease in shipping costs, such flag-of-
convenience states often lack the naval power to protect their ships, or 
the ability to arrest or prosecute pirates. After all, ships fly under these 
flags due to the reduced cost (as well as the reduced regulation), not be-
cause of the flag-nation’s ability to thwart piracy.59 
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Even the stronger nations of the world, which tend to be most con-
cerned about protecting international commerce as a general premise, 
often lack the incentive or ability to prosecute pirates. Many countries, 
such as Denmark, simply have weak or insufficient laws to prosecute 
pirates.60 The jurisdictional reach of the criminal laws of other countries 
do not extend past their territorial waters.61 Other nations are concerned 
about the legal consequences of capturing pirates. The United Kingdom, 
for example, has advised its navy to avoid detaining pirates of certain 
nationalities for fear that the pirate would invoke a claim of asylum un-
der British law if the United Kingdom sought to return them to their 
homes and the pirates claimed that their home country would torture or 
execute them as punishment for piracy.62 Finally, criminal trials of pi-
rates are usually quite expensive, which has also reduced the will of 
western powers to try pirates for their crimes.63 
The result has been that, rather than capture and prosecute such ma-
rauders, “the standard procedure thus far has been to chase off the pirates 
without apprehending them, or to promptly release those that have been 
picked up.”64 In one study, for example, European ships caught 275 pi-
rates during a two-month period in 2010 and released 235 of them.65 Of 
course, the United States was hardly much better, catching 39 pirates 
during that period and releasing just about half of them.66 The problem 
has become so exacerbated that, rather than capture and prosecute pi-
rates, some European countries give the pirates a lift back to port if the 
pirates’ ship has become disabled.67 It is widely noted that this “catch 
and release” policy has proven exceptionally ineffective at stopping pira-
cy.68 As the United Nations Security Council has noted, this “has led to 
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pirates being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there 
is sufficient evidence to support prosecution.”69 
Overall, the potentially large benefit, and the lack of enforcement or 
other risk, provides a clear incentive to engage in piracy.70 As the head of 
the International Maritime Bureau observed, “there are hardly any cases 
where these attackers are arrested and brought to trial. Piracy is a high-
profit, low-risk activity.”71 This combination creates the possibility of 
matters getting far worse before they get better, with serious and signifi-
cant worldwide consequences if not repulsed.72 
C. Piracy as a U.S. National Security Threat 
For decades, if not centuries, the United States viewed maritime pi-
racy as the subject of history books and Disneyland rides. Yet events in 
the past decade have amply demonstrated that piracy poses a very signif-
icant national security threat in a variety of ways. The United States has 
tepidly recognized this threat. In 2007, then-President Bush issued the 
first uniform U.S. policy on the topic since the 1800s.73 Though the actu-
al policy, formally entitled the U.S. Policy for the Repression of Piracy 
and Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, offered only minor solutions 
to the problem, it at least recognized the national security threat posed by 
piracy: 
Piracy threatens U.S. national security interests and the freedom and 
safety of maritime navigation throughout the world, undermines 
economic security, and contributes to the destabilization of weak or 
failed state governance. The combination of illicit activity and vio-
lence at sea might also be associated with other maritime challeng-
es, including illegal, unlawful, and unregulated fishing, international 
smuggling, and terrorism.74 
Yet this generalized statement misses several critical factors and, in any 
case, hardly captures the overall national security threat. Piracy threatens 
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the lives of Americans abroad, undermines world commerce, augments 
instability in politically fragile regions, endangers the natural resources 
of the sea, and provides a potentially devastating weapon to terrorists. 
1. Threats to the Lives of U.S. Travelers 
In just the past few years, pirates have attacked U.S. vessels on sev-
eral occasions. The attack on the Alabama described in the introduction 
is just one example.75 Other examples include two separate pirate attacks 
on U.S. military vessels in 2010 near Somalia, where the pirates in both 
cases believed the vessels to be merchant ships.76 Fortunately, neither 
attack was successful as the U.S. military in both situations not only re-
pelled the attack, but also managed to capture large numbers of the pi-
rates.77 
More tragic, however, is the fate that befell a civilian vessel, the 
Quest, which was travelling the world distributing bibles in February 
2011. In that case, pirates boarded the private yacht while it sailed off the 
coast of Oman and took the four American civilians on board hostage. 78 
After several days of failed negotiations and for reasons that remain un-
clear, the pirates eventually shot and killed all four hostages.79 The four 
Americans are believed to be the first U.S. citizens killed by pirates in 
modern times.80 A U.S. naval ship, which had been tracking the Quest, 
immediately boarded the vessel upon hearing gunfire and proceeded to 
kill two of the pirates and capture the remaining fourteen.81 Those four-
teen captured pirates were indicted in the United States for piracy, con-
spiracy to commit kidnapping, and use of a firearm during a crime of 
violence.82 Several of the pirates pled guilty and received life sentences.83 
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2. Devastating Impact on U.S. and World Trade 
Most Americans likely believe that the transportation of most of the 
world’s commerce takes place primarily by plane or truck. In fact, the 
vast majority of world trade is conducted by ship. Indeed, it is estimated 
that ninety-five percent of international trade is conducted through sea 
transportation,84 with approximately 21,000 ships travelling in or near 
Somalia’s waters every year.85 Of critical import, nearly fifty percent of 
the world’s oil supply is transported via ship,86 and about twelve percent 
of that supply travels right past Somalia, through the nearby Gulf of 
Aden.87 
Piracy constitutes the greatest criminal threat to this maritime 
commerce.88 The estimated cost of pirate attacks ranges from $12 billion 
to $25 billion per year.89 And these figures are likely drastically under-
stated, as large numbers of pirate attacks are never reported for a variety 
of reasons.90 Further, these numbers do not include indirect costs, such as 
increased insurance premiums to shipping companies, or increased fees 
that such shipping companies pass to customers to cover the heightened 
cost and risk.91 
The types of vessels being attacked range from small yachts (such 
as the Quest) to major shipping vessels (like the Alabama). Of particular 
concern to world trade, however, is the fact that pirates are expanding 
their targets beyond standard commercial vessels and seizing ships with 
greater economic impact, especially vessels transporting oil. In 2008, 
pirates seized a Saudi tanker carrying more than $100 million in crude 
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oil.92 In January 2009, the owners of the oil tanker MV Sirius Star, which 
had been captured by pirates, reportedly paid $3 million in ransom to 
have their vessel released.93 In February 2011, pirates seized a Greek-
flagged supertanker, the Irene SL, carrying a cargo of 266,000 tons of 
crude oil, off the coast of Oman.94 That same week, Somali pirates hi-
jacked an Italian-flagged tanker in the Indian Ocean that was carrying oil 
from Sudan to Malaysia.95 In 2011, pirates committed nineteen attacks 
against maritime vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, outside of Benin; all of 
the attacks were against fuel tankers.96 
3. Political and Regional Destabilization  
Far from merely affecting a solitary ship and its crew, piracy can 
significantly impact the political stability of coastal states. As one com-
mentator noted, piracy may only be a “marginal problem in itself, but the 
connections between organized piracy and wider criminal networks and 
corruption on land make it an element of a phenomenon that can have a 
weakening effect on states and a destabilizing one on the regions in 
which it is found.”97 The situation in Somalia is a perfect example of this. 
Somalia has lacked a real federal government since 1991.98 Such anarchy 
has reduced the nation’s ability to effectively patrol its own waters, lead-
ing the area to become rife with piracy.99 The piracy in turn has added to 
the nation’s political instability, as regional warlords have begun organ-
izing pirates and pirate attacks as a mechanism for gaining notoriety, po-
litical advantage, and funds to perpetuate their individual fiefdoms.100 
The United Nations Security Council has noted that the piracy epi-
demic in Somalia has not only undermined the stability of that nation, 
but also “constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security in the 
region.”101 Piracy also harms nearby nations and their citizens who rely 
on maritime transportation for their livelihood and for food.102 For exam-
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ple, it is estimated that Kenya has lost revenues of close to $140 million 
due to piratical acts in the nearby Somali region.103 So concerned is the 
United Nations Security Council with the problem that it has become 
seized with the issue and, in the past few years, has passed numerous 
resolutions on the topic.104 
4. Potential Ecological Harm 
As discussed above, pirates have expanded their attacks to include 
oil tankers.105 Pirates’ focus on oil tankers increases the risk of environ-
mental damage that could occur if such vessels are run aground or dam-
aged during or after a pirate attack, perhaps deliberately. As the Exxon 
Valdez incident and similar scenarios have amply demonstrated, dam-
aged oil tankers can cause extensive environmental harm.106 Yet, oil is 
not the most dangerous item carried by ships, which also haul deadly 
chemicals and highly explosive gases such as liquefied natural gas.107 In 
2003, for example, pirates made three separate attacks on different chem-
ical tankers in the Straits of Malacca.108 In 2007, pirates hijacked the Jap-
anese tanker Golden Nori, carrying 40,000 tons of benzene, a highly ex-
plosive chemical, and held it for ransom.109 More recently, in January 
2011, Somali pirates seized an 11,500-ton South Korean chemical carri-
er.110 South Korean Special Forces eventually raided the carrier and re-
captured it, killing eight pirates and seizing five others in the process (no 
hostages were killed).111 
Fortunately, so far, none of these pirate attacks have resulted in any 
spillage of toxic chemicals.112 Yet there are still significant ecological 
worries that a ship carrying hazardous cargo or oil, run aground by pi-
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rates, could cause serious damage to the marine environment and nearby 
coastal states.113 
5. Terrorism 
The greatest national security threat posed by piracy is its potential 
interplay with terrorism. Indeed, there are striking similarities between 
pirates and terrorists. Both rely upon violence and fear to achieve their 
goals; both operate outside of and often against society, especially world 
powers; both usually originate out of impoverished communities that 
offer little hope of upward mobility; both live with few boundaries and 
are generally considered pariahs; and both defy traditional legal methods 
of control and punishment.114 With such similarities, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that pirates and terrorists might unite, or at least temporarily work 
together for a common cause.115 
Such concerns are not theoretical.116 In 1985, Palestinian pirates 
posing as passengers hijacked the Achilles Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, 
off the coast of Egypt and eventually killed one physically disabled Jew-
ish American before surrendering.117 In early 2000, al-Qaeda terrorists 
attempted to ram a boat with explosives into the USS Sullivans in the 
waters off Yemen.118 They failed only because the explosives were too 
heavy and the boat sank before it could complete its mission.119 Unfortu-
nately, the terrorist group learned from its mistakes, and later that year 
al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen successfully sailed a small dingy packed 
with explosives into the USS Cole, blowing a hole in the U.S. warship 
and killing seventeen American sailors aboard.120 
More maritime terrorist attacks have taken place since the Cole 
bombing. In October 2001, Tamil Tiger separatists used five boats to 
engage in a suicide attack on an oil tanker off of Northern Sri Lanka.121 
In 2002, the Moroccan government arrested several al-Qaeda operatives 
who were plotting attacks against American and British ships travelling 
through the Strait of Gibraltar.122 Later that year, alleged al-Qaeda opera-
tives detonated a small boat filled with explosives alongside a French 
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Supertanker, the Limburg, in the waters off of Yemen, resulting in the 
release of almost 100,000 barrels of crude oil.123 In the spring of 2010, 
radical Islamists took over Xarardheere, which is considered one of the 
prime pirate coves in the central Somali coast.124 
Further, it appears that the Somali militant group al-Shabaab has 
been using proceeds from piracy ransoms to purchase weapons and ex-
plosives from al-Qaeda.125 While al-Shabaab has traditionally focused its 
efforts on overthrowing the transitional government in Somalia, it has 
recently branched into terrorist attacks outside of Somalia, including sui-
cide bombings in Uganda, and has announced a formal merger with al-
Qaeda.126 In addition, senior members of Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indone-
sian terrorist organization linked to al-Qaeda, have acknowledged plans 
to attack vessels traversing the waters surrounding Indonesia.127 An In-
donesian separatist group, the Free Aceh Movement, has long engaged in 
pirate attacks to raise money via ransoms for their cause.128 Other terror-
ist groups—including Hizbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command, and the Tamil Tigers—have plotted pirat-
ical attacks.129 Osama Bin Laden’s personal documents, recovered as part 
of the raid that ended his life, included a plan to hijack oil tankers in or-
der to explode them in key shipping lanes.130 Overall, then, as one set of 
commentators has noted, “[t]he ease with which Somali pirates are cap-
turing a huge range of vessels . . . illustrates the high level of risk that 
terrorist attacks may pose to global shipping.”131 
Yet these attacks, as devastating as they may have been, are merely 
the tip of the potential iceberg of the terrorist threat posed by piracy. 
Without seeking to give a blueprint to terrorists, there are numerous, hor-
rific pira-terrorist attacks that could be fairly easily accomplished and 
would have a devastating effect on the United States and the world. Ex-
panding on lessons learned from the Achilles Lauro incident, pirates 
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could hijack one of any of the dozen mega-size cruise ships that traverse 
the Caribbean on any given day. Instead of killing one passenger, though, 
they could hold hostage over or even kill hundreds, if not thousands. Al-
ternatively, terrorists could scuttle a large bulk vessel or a supertanker in 
a strategic shipping lane to devastating effect on U.S. and world com-
merce.132 Pirates could use a hijacked ship as a platform for detonating a 
dirty bomb or even a nuclear weapon in a populous port.133 Pira-terrorists 
could also seek to capture a maritime vessel transporting weapons, to be 
used for future terrorist attacks. Indeed, in 2008, pirates seized a Ukraini-
an freighter holding tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and weaponry.134 The pi-
rates there did not appear to have terrorism on their minds, however, as 
they released the ship after the payment of a $3.2 million ransom,135 but 
the potential for misuse of the weapons aboard the ship was clearly pre-
sent. 
Most concerning, perhaps, just as al-Qaeda terrorists used airplanes 
in 9/11 to attack the World Trade Center in New York, so too could a 
maritime vessel be used to attack a coastal or off coastal target, such as 
an oil platform, a cruise ship, or a U.S. naval ship, as was done with the 
USS Cole. As a U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) offi-
cial recently noted, “it would not take much of a leap to show that a ship 
could become the bomb, particularly a ship with volatile cargo.”136 There 
is evidence that plans for using sea vessels in such a manner are indeed 
underway. The most dramatic indication of these plans are the examples 
of pira-terrorists hijacking tankers for the apparent sole purpose of prac-
ticing steering them through crowded sea lanes.137 Other examples 
abound of pirates questioning captured maritime crews about how to op-
erate ships without any interest in how to dock them.138 
In many ways, maritime vessels offer an easier mechanism for ter-
rorism than aircraft. This stems primarily from the fact that terrorist at-
tacks on or using aircraft almost always have a single choke point—the 
place of embarkation. Terrorists can really only board, emplace explo-
sive devices on, or attack an aircraft at or near an airport. This allows 
prevention of aviation attacks to focus almost exclusively on airports, 
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and therefore tends to dramatically limit the window of opportunity for 
aviation attacks, the number of terrorists that can be involved, and the 
weaponry that can be used. 
Such limitations in opportunity, numbers, and weaponry do not ex-
ist with regard to piracy. As the examples throughout this Article demon-
strate, a maritime vessel, though susceptible to attack at a port, can be 
and often is more easily attacked while in transit in the open seas. This 
dramatically increases the timeframe during which an attack on a mari-
time vessel can take place—amounting to days, weeks, or months, as 
opposed to the few hours available before aircraft takeoff. Pirates can 
also arm their ships with as much personnel and weaponry as their ves-
sels will carry. And, whereas airplane hijackers must generally circum-
vent heavy airport security to mount an attack, assaults on ships can and 
do occur in open waters, where there is little protection and nowhere to 
hide.139 Overall, this makes pira-terrorism as much, if not more, of a con-
cern than aviation-based terrorism. 
III. WHAT INTERNATIONAL LAW PERMITS 
To combat the substantial threat posed by piracy, the international 
community has formulated an extensive array of laws. These laws range 
from customary international law to international conventions to United 
Nations Security Council resolutions. We will consider each in turn.140 
A. Customary International Law 
For centuries, customary international law has held that every state 
has “universal jurisdiction” with regard to piracy, namely, the ability to 
prosecute a pirate “irrespective of the connection between the pirate, 
their victims or the vessel attacked and the prosecuting State.”141 This 
stems from the base belief that pirates are enemies of all mankind, as 
they indiscriminately attack ships of any country and have no national 
loyalties.142 Thus, all states have an interest in countering piracy given 
                                                 
 139. Id. at 66. 
 140. The international law treaties covered in this part reflect the four current major conven-
tions. Other conventions that touch on piracy exist, but these conventions are less likely to help 
combat piracy because they suffer from one or a combination of the following problems: they tend to 
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supra note 43, at 34–75. 
 141. Id. at 5; Azubuike, supra note 14, at 54 (“One of the fairly undisputed aspects of the in-
ternational law on piracy is that it is subject to universal jurisdiction.”). 
 142. Azubuike, supra note 14, at 54; Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain: What Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
111, 115 (2004). 
2012] Maritime Piracy 89 
the risk that any nation’s ship could be attacked143 and the deleterious 
impact piracy has on global commerce.144 
Indeed, the world community has so vilified piracy that not only 
was it the original crime of universal jurisdiction,145 but for centuries it 
was considered the sole crime of universal jurisdiction.146 Recently, other 
crimes, such as slavery and genocide, have been added to the list of uni-
versal jurisdiction crimes.147 
One main problem with universal jurisdiction is that it competes 
with other jurisdictional claims. Customary international law provides 
that the countries of the pirate, the victim, and the flag state of the at-
tacked vessel all have valid claims of jurisdiction over the pirate.148 Thus, 
a number of states may have legitimate claims to prosecute a given pi-
rate, and international law imposes no rule of priority among these poten-
tially competing jurisdictions.149 Of course, like the rules of property, 
possession is ninety percent of the law—thus, the state that has custody 
over a particular pirate usually has the initial right of prosecution, or it 
can decide to transfer the pirate to another nation for punishment.150 
B. UNCLOS III 
The High Seas Convention (HSC),151 established in 1958, was the 
first instrument to codify international rules on piracy.152 The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III),153 established 
in 1982, was intended to supersede the HSC.154 Indeed, the overall pur-
pose of the portion of UNCLOS III related to piracy was to “provide the 
legal framework for the repression of piracy under international law.”155 
However, while the United States signed and ratified the HSC, it has 
never formally become a party to UNCLOS III, for reasons unrelated to 
the anti-piracy provisions of the convention.156 Therefore, the U.S. still 
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technically operates under the provisions of the HSC, along with seven 
other states and the Holy See.157 Nonetheless, the United States has offi-
cially pronounced its acceptance of virtually all of the precepts of 
UNCLOS III, including those related to piracy, and now considers these 
provisions to be customary international law.158 I will therefore focus my 
discussion on the provisions of UNCLOS III, not the HSC it was intend-
ed to replace, though the key provisions on piracy in both conventions 
are virtually identical.159 
The provisions of UNCLOS III that relate to piracy assert that “[a]ll 
States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of 
piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State.”160 Most critically, the convention permits any state to “seize a 
pirate ship . . . , and arrest the persons and seize the property on 
board.”161 The seizing nation can then decide what penalties to impose on 
the pirates and what action to take with regard to the seized property.162  
While seemingly broad on its face, UNCLOS III has several, well-
noted limitations. To begin with, its provisions apply only on the high 
seas163 and cannot be utilized within the territorial waters of any sover-
eign nation.164 This means that, under UNCLOS III, nations cannot seize 
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pirates who are found in the territorial waters of another country, or pur-
sue a pirate into those territorial waters, absent the consent of the coastal 
state165 or a reciprocity agreement between the two countries involved.166 
This limitation stems from a historical belief that while acts of piracy on 
the high seas interfered with international shipping, pirate attacks within 
a nation’s territorial waters were more of an internal affair to be dealt 
with by the relevant state through its navy and domestic courts.167 None-
theless, this represents an enormous loophole exploited by pirates, who 
often quickly retreat to territorial waters, such as that of dysfunctional 
states like Somalia, to avoid attack or seizure.168 
The UNCLOS III provisions also contain a “two-ship” requirement; 
they apply only to attacks committed by one private vessel against an-
other.169 This limitation is based on the idea that acts committed aboard a 
ship, without outside influence, were believed to concern only that ship, 
and therefore only that ship’s flag state, not the international communi-
ty.170 Regardless of the basis or rationale, this limitation has the practical 
effect of excluding from UNCLOS III’s provisions any situation in 
which a vessel is seized by its passengers or crew.171 This would there-
fore exclude terrorist attacks such as that on the Achilles Lauro,172 dis-
cussed above, which involved terrorists coming on board a ship as pas-
sengers and then engaging in an attack on the vessel.173 The two-ship 
requirement also serves to exclude attacks on ships made from land. 
A further possible limitation stems from UNCLOS III’s require-
ment that it applies only to acts undertaken for “private ends.”174 Some 
argue that this precludes any acts committed for “political,” as opposed 
to “personal,” ends.175 Under this interpretation, terrorist acts would not 
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be considered acts of piracy prohibited by UNCLOS III,176 nor would 
attacks on ships by environmentally focused organizations such as 
Greenpeace,177 as both types of attacks are committed for political pur-
poses, not pure financial enrichment. The majority view, however, relies 
on the drafting history of the provision to argue that the term “private 
ends” refers to the difference between “private” and “public” acts. Under 
this interpretation, the act must be committed by a private entity rather 
than by or on behalf of a government.178 As noted above, historically, 
some states used pirates for political ends.179 Thus, proponents of this 
interpretation assert that the requirement of “private ends” is meant to 
reflect this historical background by distinguishing between acts commit-
ted by ships on behalf of a government (which would not be piracy pro-
hibited by UNCLOS III) versus acts committed by ships that are uncon-
nected to any state.180 This majority view comports with the common 
base understanding that pirates do not act on behalf of any state.181 
Finally, and perhaps most critically, UNCLOS III does not provide 
any guidance or requirements for the punishment of pirates. UNCLOS III 
not only leaves it up to each state to decide how to punish pirates, but 
indeed does not even require that nations actually punish captured pi-
rates.182 This leads to inconsistencies amongst nations as to the degree to 
which pirates are punished, and also undoubtedly encourages pirates to 
operate in territories in which the host nation is uninterested or unable to 
mount piracy prosecutions. 
C. SUA 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)183 sought to resolve the gaps and 
limitations on piracy created by UNCLOS III.184 It went into force in 
1992,185 and the United States ratified it in 1995.186 
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Article 3 of the SUA provides that “[a]ny person commits an of-
fence if that person unlawfully and intentionally . . . seizes or exercises 
control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimi-
dation.”187 Attempting, abetting, or threatening such an offense is also a 
crime.188 Such a broad statement means that, unlike in UNCLOS III, the 
piratical act need not be on the high seas, but can also be within the terri-
torial waters of another sovereign nation,189 so long as that nation is a 
party to the SUA.190 There is also no two-ship requirement and no re-
quirement that the act be for “personal gain.”191 Indeed, the only scenario 
in which the SUA Convention would not apply is when all facets of the 
piratical act take place within a nation’s sovereign territory, namely, the 
pirate attack is committed entirely within a state’s territorial waters, the 
vessel was not scheduled to leave those territorial waters, and the pirate 
was seized within those territorial waters.192 Such a limitation is negligi-
ble, as most pirate attacks originally take place outside a nation’s waters 
or at least involve a ship that is leaving or transgressing those waters.193   
Enforcement of the Article 3 provisions is left to individual nations. 
However, the SUA sought to resolve the ambiguous enforcement provi-
sions of UNCLOS III by requiring all parties to enact domestic legisla-
tion to make the offenses in Article 3 a national crime if the act is com-
mitted against or on board the nation’s flag vessel, within the nation’s 
territory (including territorial waters), or by one of its nationals.194 Na-
tions are also encouraged, but not required, to extend their criminal juris-
diction to encompass acts of piracy committed against one of their na-
tionals, as well as in other circumstances.195 Finally, the SUA requires 
that a party to the treaty either prosecute a pirate who is present in the 
state’s territory or extradite that pirate to another state that has criminal 
jurisdiction over the pirate.196 Thus, again unlike UNCLOS III, the SUA 
theoretically provides no safety from prosecution to pirates hiding in the 
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territorial waters of an SUA nation that is uninterested or incapable of 
prosecuting them. 
Based on these provisions, many individuals have argued that the 
SUA constitutes a very strong international treaty with regard to piracy. 
As Admiral Thad Allen, then Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, 
claimed, “[l]everaging States SUA obligations in conjunction with exist-
ing international law against piracy provides an effective legal frame-
work to deliver an ‘endgame.’”197 This seems overly optimistic, however. 
A number of critical nations have not ratified the SUA, including Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, and Somalia.198 Further, even nations that have ratified 
the agreement have often failed to fulfill its provisions and have not en-
acted forceful domestic criminal statutes related to piracy.199 So pro-
nounced is this problem that the United Nations Security Council has 
repeatedly passed resolutions urging nations not only to ratify the SUA 
Convention, but also to adopt domestic legislation to conform to the 
SUA’s provisions.200 Overall, while the SUA appears wide-ranging in its 
application and scope, the reality is that domestic statutes enacted pursu-
ant to its provisions have only been used as the basis for a single reported 
criminal case worldwide.201 
D. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(“Hostage Taking Convention”)202 entered into force in 1983.203 The 
United States became a party to the convention in 1985,204 and most na-
tions in the world have now ratified it.205 The convention declares, 
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 Any person who detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to contin-
ue to detain another person . . . in order to compel a third par-
ty . . . to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of tak-
ing of hostages.206  
There are no territorial limitations.207 
However, similar to the SUA, the Hostage Taking Convention does 
not cover situations in which all facets of the act occur with a sovereign 
nation—the offense is committed within a state, the hostage and alleged 
offender are nationals of that state, and the offended is found in that 
state.208 Also similar to the SUA, the Hostage Taking Convention seeks 
to enforce its provisions by requiring parties to the convention to pass 
domestic laws establishing “appropriate penalties” for such offenses.209 
Finally, it is widely accepted, at least with regard to acts related to pira-
cy, that the Hostage Taking Convention adds virtually nothing that is not 
already covered by the SUA,210 except perhaps another criminal charge 
to levy against the pirate. 
E. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), entering into force in 2002.211 The purpose of the ICC is to ensure 
that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole [do] not go unpunished.”212 The court’s jurisdiction is limited 
to only those “most serious crimes of concern,” which the statute deline-
ates as genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against 
humanity.213 
It does not appear that piracy falls within any of those four sets of 
crimes. Clearly, the first two—genocide and war crimes—would not typ-
ically cover acts of piracy. The third set, crimes of aggression, is defined 
as the planning or execution of the “use of an armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
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United Nations.”214 As piracy, by definition, does not involve actions by 
one state against another, but rather activities perpetrated by nonstate 
actors,215 piracy would not constitute a “crime of aggression.” 
The last set of crimes that falls within the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
crimes against humanity. This encompasses any of eleven enumerated 
crimes, including murder, extermination, enslavement, rape, and “[o]ther 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”216 Piracy is not 
specifically enumerated, and it would not appear to fall within any of the 
eleven listed categories. Even the catchall provision would not apply be-
cause piracy, though a heinous crime, is generally treated more as an 
economic crime than one of physical bodily harm (though the latter can 
certainly be an outcome of piracy). 
Thus, as many commentators have noted, while the ICC may one 
day provide a mechanism for prosecuting pirates, that day is not yet 
here.217 Further, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute and 
therefore is not a member of the court.218 
F. United Nations Charter and Resolutions 
The United Nations, its Charter, and its various resolutions play a 
significant role in the area of maritime piracy. The U.N. Charter prohibits 
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state.”219 This provision therefore precludes nations 
from advancing into the territorial waters of another nation to chase pi-
rates or to prevent a piratical act from occurring in such waters. Indeed, 
this restriction constitutes the basis for the geographic limitations of 
UNCLOS III, whereby states cannot take action against piracy within a 
nation’s territorial waters.220 
Exceptions to the general provision exist. One such exception is the 
right to individual or collective self-defense.221 Thus, a country can al-
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ways defend itself from a pirate attack. A nation may also consent to al-
low another nation to breach its territorial waters. A last exception, cap-
tured in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, permits the United Nations Se-
curity Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to “decide what measures 
shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and securi-
ty,”222 which can include violation of the territorial integrity of a particu-
lar nation normally protected by Article 2(4), as well as the use of armed 
force.223 The U.N. Charter requires all members to abide by the resolu-
tions issued by the Security Council under Chapter VII.224 As virtually 
every country in the world is a member of the United Nations,225 Security 
Council resolutions can have near universal impact. 
The United Nations Security Council became seized with the issue 
of piracy in Somalia beginning in 2008. Utilizing its Chapter VII powers, 
the Council passed five separate resolutions on the topic that year, more 
than on any other issue.226 The most relevant resolution, passed in June 
2008, permits foreign nations to enter Somalia’s territorial waters to re-
press piracy and authorizes the use of “all necessary means” to achieve 
that goal.227 However, such actions must comply with international law, 
including international human rights laws,228 and nations must 
“cooperat[e]” with the Somali government in their actions,229 though it is 
unclear whether that requires prior approval from the Somali government 
every time an action is taken.230 While the June 2008 resolution, by its 
terms, applied for only a six-month period, subsequent Security Council 
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resolutions have continued to authorize such activity up to the present 
day231 and expanded the scope of military options to include actions on 
land in Somalia.232 The United States takes the position that these Securi-
ty Council resolutions also permit action against piracy in Somali air-
space.233 
The Security Council took pains to note repeatedly in these resolu-
tions that the legal basis for the above actions stems from requests by the 
putative Somali government to the United Nations Security Council for 
assistance in thwarting piracy in Somalia’s territorial waters, and the 
Somali government’s continued support for the Security Council’s reso-
lutions on this issue.234 The Security Council further noted, 
[T]he authorization provided in this resolution applies only with re-
spect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or ob-
ligations or responsibilities of member states under international 
law, including any rights or obligations under the Convention, with 
respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that it 
shall not be considered as establishing customary international law, 
and affirms further that this authorization has been provided only 
following receipt of the letter from the Permanent Representative of 
the Somalia Republic to the United Nations to the President of the 
Security Council dated 27 February 2008 conveying the consent of 
the [Somali government].235 
Therefore, the Security Council resolutions explicitly provide that 
the right to pursue, capture, and use force against pirates within the terri-
torial waters of Somalia is based on the consent of the nation at issue and 
does not create a precedent to engage in such actions within the territorial 
waters of other nations. Nonetheless, some commentators argue that a 
customary international law rule already exists to permit foreign gov-
ernments to combat piracy in the territorial waters of another nation, so 
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long as that nation is considered a failed state.236 The theory is that if a 
country is unable to perform its duty to the international community, 
such as preventing piracy or human rights violations within its territorial 
waters, then it no longer has a basis to assert sovereignty over those terri-
torial waters. As such, there is no violation of the failed nation’s territori-
al integrity if other states enter its supposed territorial waters in order to 
pursue or thwart piracy.237 There is no indication, however, that the U.S. 
government has accepted this theory.  
IV. U.S. LAW ON PIRACY 
The international law provisions outlined in Part III offer a wide 
scope of options with regard to thwarting piracy. However, they do not 
define the full range of options available to the United States in ap-
proaching this threat. This is because, while international law provides 
the general authority for nations to combat piracy, actual enforcement 
mechanisms are decided on a nation-by-nation basis as the above discus-
sion on the SUA illustrates.238 As one commentator has noted, “[p]iracy 
has always been an international crime enforced by national laws, the 
exact terms of which have varied between jurisdictions.”239 Thus, while 
the international conventions in force provide the parameters for Ameri-
can action, the real ability of the United States to thwart piracy stems 
from its own domestic laws. 
The authority for the United States to take action against pirates 
does not arise from some obscure statute, but rather stems from an ex-
plicit provision in the U.S. Constitution, which is an indication of the 
extent to which piracy concerned our nation’s founding fathers. In what 
has come to be known as the Offense Clause,240 the Constitution specifi-
cally provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.”241 This constitutional provision stemmed from the 
long-held belief that piracy constituted a violation of the laws of all 
countries.242 As the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically pronounced in 
1826, “[p]irates may, without doubt, be lawfully captured on the ocean 
by the public or private ships of every nation; for they are, in truth, the 
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common enemies of all mankind, and, as such, as liable to the extreme 
rights of war.”243 Based upon the Offense Clause, it has long been settled 
that the U.S. Congress has the authority to pass a wide range of statutes 
to protect the nation against pirates.244 Congress has utilized such author-
ity extensively over the centuries. 
A. Use of U.S. Military to Kill or Capture Pirates 
Pursuant to the Offense Clause, Congress passed legislation in the 
early 1800s authorizing the President to employ military vessels to pro-
tect U.S. merchant vessels from pirate attacks.245 In 2006, President 
Bush, utilizing this authority in conjunction with the international con-
ventions and Security Council resolutions described in Part III, placed 
Navy ships in and around Somalia to protect vessels against pirates, and 
directed the Navy to take military action against piratical attacks in that 
area, including firing upon pirates, seizing their vessels, and capturing 
pirates for prosecution.246 This was the first authorized engagement of 
U.S. warships against pirates in 150 years.247 Together with military 
ships of other NATO countries, the U.S. Navy now patrols those waters 
as part of NATO’s Combined Task Force 151.248 
U.S. military activity against pirates in and around Somalia is not 
open ended, however. The ability of the United States to patrol and en-
gage pirates in Somalia’s territorial waters is conducted pursuant to the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions described above, and the 
willingness of the Somali “government” to permit such actions to contin-
ue. Not only does this mean that such activities could cease at any mo-
ment, but it also means that the United States must ensure that its activi-
ties comply with the limitations contained in those resolutions. Unex-
pectedly, the requirement in the resolutions that all nations abide by in-
ternational humanitarian law249 has placed a significant limitation on 
U.S. action. Under international law, pirates are not considered combat-
ants, but instead are deemed civilians. International humanitarian law 
precludes targeting civilians except in situations of self-defense.250 Due 
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to this restriction, U.S. military action has been primarily defensive in 
nature.251 
Outside of Somalia, the ability of the U.S. military to engage pirates 
is even more limited. Consistent with the Offense Clause and statutory 
authority, the military can defend U.S. merchant ships from pirate at-
tacks. But under UNCLOS III and the U.N. Charter, any such actions 
cannot occur within the territorial waters of any other nation, absent Se-
curity Council authorization or consent from the host nation. Further, 
even if a pirate attack takes place on the high seas, the United States can-
not chase the pirates into the territorial sovereignty of another nation 
(again, unless the nation consents).252 
Nonetheless, even with these restrictions, the U.S. military has tak-
en several active steps to combat pirates. The most dramatic, of course, 
was the sniper attack against the pirates holding the captain of the Ala-
bama, described in the Introduction.253 In another example, in April 
2010, the USS Ashland destroyed a skiff in the Gulf of Yemen that was 
carrying pirates who were intent on boarding the Ashland; the Ashland 
ended up capturing many of the pirates.254 That same month, in the high 
seas between Somalia and Seychelles, the USS Nicolas returned fire on 
two small assault boats attempting to attack the U.S. frigate, believing 
her to be a merchant ship.255 When the boats broke off the attack and 
fled, the Nicolas followed and eventually captured several of the pi-
rates.256 In September 2010, Marines conducted a pre-dawn raid against a 
ship in the Gulf of Aden that pirates had captured.257 The Marines retook 
the ship and arrested the nine pirates on board without firing a single 
shot.258 In January 2012, a U.S. Navy destroyer even rescued an Iranian 
fishing boat outside the Persian Gulf that pirates had held captive for 
more than forty days, despite Iran’s concurrent demands that the Ameri-
can military vessels cease patrolling the area.259 Altogether, the U.S. Na-
vy has captured hundreds of pirates and thwarted numerous pirate at-
tacks.260 The success rate of piracy attacks in the regions of U.S. naval 
patrols has dropped precipitously—from sixty-three percent in 2007 to 
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thirty-four percent in 2008 and twenty-one percent in 2009.261 Attacks 
fell forty-three percent in 2011, due mainly to military presence.262 
There is some question, however, as to the overall efficacy of U.S. 
military action against piracy. While American efforts have tended to 
deter many piratical acts along the Somali coastline, the pirates have re-
sponded by moving their operations further and further from that shore, 
up to 1,000 miles from the coast.263 This has had the ironic effect of dra-
matically increasing the area under patrol by the U.S. Navy by almost 
one million square miles since 2009.264 Naval commanders have 
acknowledged that the resultant area under patrol—more than 2.5 million 
nautical miles265—is much too large an area to police effectively.266 Fur-
ther, as noted above, though the United States captures a number of pi-
rates, it allows a large number (close to half) to go free.267 Together, the-
se limitations raise questions about the overall deterrence value of such 
patrols.268 
In addition, there is an overarching question as to whether, in a time 
of U.S. budgetary crisis, it makes sense to spend significant sums of U.S. 
funds to patrol far away oceans. Many have noted that the cost of paying 
ransoms, even the seemingly astronomical ransoms outlined above, is 
cumulatively a much lower amount than the cost of supporting U.S. na-
val efforts around Somalia.269 As one commentator recently noted, it is 
valid to question whether it makes sense to “send $1 billion destroyers, 
with crews of 300 each, to handle five Somali pirates in a fiberglass 
skiff.”270 
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B. Seizure of Piratical Vessels 
Another option to combat piracy is to seize pirate vessels, which 
Congress has permitted. Specifically, pursuant to the Offense Clause, 
Congress has authorized the President by statute to direct the U.S. mili-
tary to “subdue, seize, take, and send into any port of the United States” 
any vessel that attempts or commits a piratical attack against any U.S. 
vessel or citizen, or indeed against any vessel at all.271 The Coast Guard 
has similar authority to seize ships on the high seas or any waters over 
which the United States has jurisdiction, if the vessel is believed to have 
violated U.S. law, including by piracy.272 
U.S. courts have consistently upheld the right of the United States 
to engage in such seizures.273 The knowledge of the ship’s owner that the 
vessel would be used in piratical activity is not relevant.274 An open 
question, however, exists as to whether the United States can seize ships 
that have been stolen or have mutinied and are subsequently used for 
piracy.275 Finally, it should be noted that, while the ship may be confis-
cated, any innocent cargo aboard the ship usually cannot be seized by the 
United States unless the owners of that cargo either cooperated in or au-
thorized the act of piracy.276 
C. Covert Action 
“Covert action” is “an activity or activities of the U.S. Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it 
is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be ap-
parent or acknowledged publicly.”277 It therefore involves an attempt by 
the U.S. government to create an impact overseas, while hiding the U.S. 
government’s involvement. By statute, the President may authorize a 
government agency to engage in covert action operations if the President 
“determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign 
policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national 
security of the United States.”278 The government agency typically in-
volved in covert action is my agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. 
                                                 
 271. 33 U.S.C. § 382 (2006). 
 272. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2006); see also Robert D. Peltz & Lawrence W. Kaye, The Long Reach of 
U.S. Law Over Crimes Occurring on the High Seas, 20 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 199, 226–27 (2007–2008) 
(describing the ability of the Coast Guard to seize vessels that have violated U.S. laws). 
 273. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 39–41 (1826). 
 274. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 234 (1844). 
 275. Id. at 235–36. 
 276. Id. at 237. 
 277. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006). 
 278. Id. § 413b(a). 
104 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:69 
Pursuant to this authority, a U.S. President could legally authorize a 
U.S. government agency to engage in covert action operations against 
pirates by directing the agency to help defend commercial vessels from 
pirate attacks, or even to engage in lethal or nonlethal action against the 
pirates themselves or the nations or individuals who support them. By 
statute, such covert action would have to comply with U.S. law and the 
U.S. Constitution279 as well as international conventions such as the SUA 
and UNCLOS III, both of which the United States has accepted.280 How-
ever, I have found no indication in any open source literature or public 
statement that any President has ever authorized a U.S. government 
agency to engage in any covert action operations against any pirates. 
D. Arresting Pirates 
As discussed in Part V, piracy and numerous acts related to piracy 
are prohibited under U.S. law. Different U.S. government agencies have 
authority to implement these statutes by capturing and arresting individ-
uals involved in piratical attacks. The Coast Guard can arrest individuals 
in U.S. waters and on the high seas for violations of U.S. law or for pre-
vention of future violations of U.S. law. 281 This authority applies to both 
U.S.-flagged vessels and foreign-flagged vessels,282 and to both U.S. and 
non-U.S. citizens.283 The FBI can make arrests worldwide if it has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that there has been a felony in violation of 
U.S. law.284 Such arrests, however, when conducted outside of U.S. terri-
torial waters, must comply with international law and specifically with 
the limitations imposed by UNCLOS III and the U.N. Charter.285 Finally, 
the President has the authority to direct the military to capture pirates for 
prosecution.286 As indicated in Part IV, Presidents have directed the U.S. 
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Navy to engage in such capture operations in the waters surrounding 
Somalia.287 
E. Extradition and Rendition 
If the United States is unable to capture a pirate but discovers the 
pirate in a third country, the United States has several legal mechanisms 
to bring the individual to justice in the United States. One such mecha-
nism would be to seek extradition of that individual through the foreign 
country’s court system. However, many of the bilateral extradition trea-
ties that the United States has entered into explicitly preclude the extradi-
tion of any national of the foreign country.288 This can create obvious 
limitations on seeking extradition of pirates unless the pirate is a national 
of the United States or a third country. Further, extradition can be a slow 
process, often hampered by a lack of political will of the foreign nation, 
slow court systems, and ineffective or corrupt judiciaries or prosecu-
tors.289 In the case of Somalia, for example, a lack of a working govern-
ment and working court system clearly hampers any attempt to extradite 
pirates from that country.290 
The United States also has the option of turning to rendition in in-
stances where extradition proves unworkable.291 A rendition is the “for-
cible movement of an individual from one country to another, without 
use of a formal legal process, such as an extradition mechanism.”292 Used 
by the United States government for centuries, rendition operations are 
less expensive than extraditions, do not require use of a foreign nation’s 
(sometimes corrupt or unworkable) court system, and often permit the 
host nation to have plausible deniability.293 They are also much more 
controversial.294 Though there is no indication that the United States has 
rendered any pirates to the United States, U.S. courts have nonetheless 
indicated that the rendition of a pirate to the United States would not un-
dermine the ability of the United States to prosecute such an individu-
al.295 
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F. Self-Help 
In addition to the above options, U.S. laws originally enacted in 
1819 permit U.S.-flagged vessels to defend themselves from attack. Spe-
cifically, the commander and crew of any U.S.-flagged vessel can “op-
pose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or 
seizure” by any vessel as long as the aggressor vessel is not operated by 
the U.S. government or any “nation in amity with the United States.”296 
The U.S.-flagged vessel may also subdue and capture the attacking ves-
sel.297 
Nevertheless, U.S. regulations and laws enacted to preclude weap-
ons trafficking298 make it very difficult for U.S.-flagged vessels to arm 
themselves in order to engage in such self-help or self-defense. These 
regulations prohibit U.S.-flagged ships from carrying virtually any ar-
mament, ammunition, or “implement of war” absent special license or 
exception.299 Violators are subject to fine or imprisonment.300 Further, 
any vessel equipping itself with weapons in or from the United States 
would likely find itself in violation of U.S. arms export statutes301 absent 
acquisition of another license, which appears to be a fairly difficult pro-
cess.302 Violators of those statutes are subject to fines of up to $1 million 
and imprisonment of up to ten years.303 
V. U.S. OPTIONS FOR PROSECUTING PIRATES 
In November 2010, a federal jury in Norfolk, Virginia, found five 
Somalis guilty of piracy and other offenses.304 They were convicted for 
opening fire on what they thought was a merchant vessel but turned out 
to be the USS Nicholas, which, as described above,305 was a U.S. guided-
missile frigate that apparently resembled a cargo ship.306 Navy gunners 
returned fire, captured the pirates, and brought them to the United States 
to face trial.307 The five pirates involved in the attack received life sen-
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tences plus eighty years.308 While certainly a triumph for the American 
judicial system, this prosecution revealed one sobering fact: it was the 
first U.S. jury conviction for piracy in almost 200 years.309 
Overall, U.S. prosecutors have indicted approximately thirty pirates 
altogether in U.S. courts.310 Aside from the Nicholas pirates, the remain-
ing pirate from the Maersk Alabama attack pled guilty to piracy and re-
ceived an almost thirty-four year sentence.311 The Ashland pirates have 
been indicted for piracy and other charges.312 In April 2011, a Washing-
ton, D.C. district court sentenced a Somali pirate to twenty-five years in 
prison for attacking a Danish ship off the coast of Somalia.313 The pirate 
had pled guilty to conspiracy to commit piracy and conspiracy to use a 
firearm during a violent crime.314 Finally, the pirates involved in the 
Quest massacre were indicted on charges of piracy, conspiracy to com-
mit kidnapping, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence; several 
of those pirates pled guilty and received life sentences.315 
Nonetheless, this seems to constitute a small number of prosecu-
tions in view of the numerous recent attacks on U.S. ships316 and the U.S. 
Navy’s capture of hundreds of pirates.317 Much of the problem is ex-
pense: transporting pirates and witnesses to the United States, as well as 
the actual prosecution of pirates in U.S. courts, can run into the millions 
of dollars.318 In addition, piracy prosecutions are not simple tasks. The 
piratical acts may have occurred in or near one country’s territorial wa-
ters, by pirates from a second country, against crews and passengers 
from a third country, aboard a flag ship of a fourth country, owned by 
nationals of a fifth country. Further, the seizure of the pirates may have 
been made by the government of a sixth country, while those pirates 
were actually located in a seventh country or in international waters. In 
other words, the real life facts can quickly turn into a made-for-law-
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school-exam scenario. As the chief of the U.S. Coast Guard’s operations 
law group recently stated, this complexity makes prosecuting difficult 
“because the effort often exceeds the benefit. You get flags from one 
country, witnesses from another, suspects from another—how do you put 
that all together in court?”319 
Despite the dearth of prosecutions, as well as the difficulties of tri-
al, numerous legal options nonetheless exist for the United States to con-
vict pirates and those who assist them, whether through the U.S. Anti-
Piracy Statute, other U.S. criminal laws, or U.S. encouragement of other 
nations’ prosecutorial efforts. 
A. The U.S. Anti-Piracy Statute 
 As noted above,320 the Offense Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
permits Congress to pass statutes to “punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”321 
Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the Anti-Piracy Statute in 
the late 1700s. Amended nominally since that time, the statute provides, 
“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by 
the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United 
States, shall be imprisoned for life.”322 While it is unclear exactly what 
the “law of nations” on piracy actually was or is,323 U.S. courts have long 
used this statute to convict individuals for acts of piracy based upon a 
definition generally on par with that discussed in Part II.324 In addition, 
the U.S. criminal code enumerates other actions that constitute violations 
of the Anti-Piracy Statute. They include the following: U.S. citizens act-
ing under the color of another nation who commit an act of hostility 
against the United States or any U.S. citizen on the high seas;325 foreign 
nationals “cruising” against the United States or its citizens on the sea in 
violation of a treaty;326 U.S. citizens who arm, serve on, or purchase an 
interest in any private vessel with the intention to commit hostilities 
against U.S. citizens or their property;327 a seaman who assaults his or 
her commander to prevent the commander’s ability to defend the ves-
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sel;328 and members of a piratical vessel who commit acts of robbery on 
shore.329 
During the first few decades of the nation’s existence, when piracy 
was prevalent, the United States utilized the Anti-Piracy Statute on nu-
merous occasions. Indeed, between 1815 and 1823, piracy convictions 
were some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most reviewed cases.330 Through 
these early decisions, which included the famous Mariana Flora331 and 
Ambrose Light332 cases, the courts established some broad legal parame-
ters for the Anti-Piracy Statute. While the statute by its express terms 
only covers attacks on the “high seas,”333 the courts have found that the 
term “high seas” should be interpreted in its popular and natural sense to 
mean any waters beyond the low-water mark, including territorial wa-
ters.334 In addition, the Fourth Circuit recently held that even unsuccess-
ful pirate attacks fall within the Anti-Piracy Statute.335 
The courts have also held that the rationale for the pirate attack is 
irrelevant. The key issue is whether the “aggression is unauthorized by 
the law of nations, hostile in its character, wanton and criminal in its 
commission, and utterly without any sanction from any public authority 
of sovereign.”336 It is therefore irrelevant whether the act was committed 
“for purposes of plunder, or for purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton 
abuse of power.”337 In the eyes of U.S. courts, a stateless individual 
should not be able to avoid the penalty of piracy due to the reason for the 
attack.338 The only “intent” necessary is the intent to attack the maritime 
vessel.339 
The Anti-Piracy Statute also enjoys exceptional jurisdictional 
reach.340 That reach encompasses activities committed in U.S. territorial 
waters, as well as crimes by or against Americans on the high seas.341 It 
also applies to crimes committed by or against Americans in foreign ter-
ritorial waters if the ship is going to or from the United States.342 
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Further, the statute protects U.S.-flagged ships wherever they may 
sail. It is well established in U.S. courts that vessels bearing the flag of 
the United States are considered an extension of the territory of the Unit-
ed States.343 Under the “Territorial Extension Doctrine,” also known as 
the “Flag State Rule,” maritime nations are considered under internation-
al law to have the inherent authority to take active measures to protect 
their vessels and punish activity that may disrupt the nation’s shipping 
interests related to its vessels.344 Pursuant to this concept, U.S. courts 
have held that the Anti-Piracy Statute protects U.S. ships and crews 
wherever they may operate, whether on the high seas or in foreign terri-
torial waters,345 as well as in U.S. territorial waters or any other waters 
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.346 
This jurisdiction therefore applies to an offense committed anywhere a 
U.S. ship operates, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the 
victim.347 In fact, the courts have held that where the perpetrator is a U.S. 
national and the activity involves a U.S.-flagged ship, the United States 
not only can prosecute the offender, but indeed has an obligation to do 
so. 348 
Yet the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. Anti-Piracy Statute even 
goes beyond U.S. territories, U.S. persons, and U.S. ships. Under a con-
cept known as the protective principle, “protective jurisdiction [over an 
individual] is proper if the activity threatens the security or governmental 
functions of the United States.”349 The activity need not take place in 
U.S. territory, the individuals involved need not be Americans, and there 
is no requirement that the United States prove an actual or even intended 
effect on the United States.350 Rather, the principle applies if the conduct 
at issue “has a potentially adverse effect and is generally recognized as a 
crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems.”351 
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The United States has long employed the protective principle in 
U.S. criminal maritime law,352 especially with regard to foreign vessels 
on the high seas, so long as the activity of the vessel is viewed as threat-
ening U.S. national security or governmental functions.353 For example, 
the United States has utilized—and U.S. courts have upheld—the protec-
tive principle to authorize the U.S. Coast Guard to stop, board, and seize 
ships believed to be involved in the transportation of drugs due to the 
threat that drug trafficking poses to the United States, even if there is no 
indication that the vessels were bound for the United States.354 The prin-
ciple has also been applied with regard to other illicit trade and smug-
gling.355 While no case appears to have explicitly applied the principle to 
piracy, given the adverse impact that piracy has on U.S. national securi-
ty, as well as the clear condemnation of piratical activities by virtually all 
nations, it is highly likely that courts would permit the protective princi-
ple to be used with regard to the Anti-Piracy Statute. 
Even beyond the protective principle is the concept of universal ju-
risdiction. As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, “[u]niversal jurisdiction 
is based on the premise that offenses against all states may be punished 
by any state where the offender is found.”356 It therefore permits a state 
to have jurisdiction over an offender “even if the offender’s acts occurred 
outside its boundaries and even if the offender has no connection to the 
state.”357 This concept does not violate an individual’s due process rights 
because “the universal condemnation of the offender’s conduct puts him 
on notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he is 
found.”358As noted in Part III, piracy is considered a universal jurisdic-
tion crime under customary international law. In fact, piracy constituted 
the “original rationale for creating universal jurisdiction” and therefore 
the United States could utilize universal jurisdiction to prosecute a pirate 
regardless of the pirate’s complete lack of any nexus to the United 
States.359 
                                                 
 352. Id. (“Reliance on the protective principle is not a novel idea in American law.”); Cox, 
supra note 88, at 147 (noting that the protective principle “is a widely recognized source of U.S. 
maritime criminal law authority”). 
 353. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 494; Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1380. 
 354. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 494; Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1154. 
 355. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 939. 
 356. United States v. Lei Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 357. Id. at 722–23. 
 358. Id. at 723. 
 359. Id. 
112 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:69 
Overall, then, the Anti-Piracy Statute has an exceptionally broad 
reach, both in its coverage and its jurisdictional application.360 
B. Other U.S. Criminal Sanctions 
In addition to the Anti-Piracy Statute, numerous other U.S. criminal 
statutes could be utilized to prosecute pirates. Such statutes may be use-
ful in situations where a court determines that the Anti-Piracy Statute is 
inapplicable or during plea bargaining. For example, robbery or burglary 
at sea is punishable by imprisonment of up to fifteen years.361 It is also a 
federal crime to commit assault on the high seas, with penalties ranging 
from six months for simple assault to upwards of twenty years for assault 
with a deadly weapon.362 It is a felony, with imprisonment of up to ten 
years, for a captain of a vessel to “piratically or feloniously” run away 
with such vessel, or yield such vessel to pirates;363 for anyone to attempt 
to corrupt a captain to run away with a vessel or to furnish a pirate with 
ammunition or provisions;364 for anyone to plunder a distressed vessel, 
preclude the escape of someone from a distressed vessel, or use a false 
light for the purpose of shipwrecking a vessel;365 for anyone to attack a 
vessel in order to plunder it;366 or for anyone to knowingly receive pirat-
ed property.367 Knowingly damaging or destroying vessels carries a pen-
alty of up to twenty years imprisonment.368 Extra criminal sanctions can 
be added on top of these charges if the attackers carried, brandished, or 
discharged a firearm in furtherance of the crime.369 
In addition, Congress has passed statutes that adopt several of the 
international conventions described above in Part III. Congress’s authori-
ty to pass such legislation stems from two constitutional provisions. The 
first is the above-mentioned Offense Clause, which authorizes Congress 
to “punish piracies.”370 In addition, the Necessary and Proper Clause au-
thorizes Congress “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
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Officer thereof.”371 These “Powers” include the President’s Treaty Power 
under Article II of the Constitution.372 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
permits Congress not only to codify international anti-piracy conventions 
into the U.S. criminal code, but also to extend jurisdiction over such acts 
beyond U.S. borders.373 
Based upon both the Offense Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the United States has implemented the provisions of the SUA 
into U.S. criminal law.374 The resultant U.S. statute precludes the unlaw-
ful and intentional seizure of a ship by force or intimidation; any act of 
violence against a person aboard a ship if the violence will endanger the 
ship’s safe navigation; destruction of a ship; or conspiracy to do any of 
these activities.375 Violators can be fined and imprisoned for up to twenty 
years.376 The mere threat to take most of these actions is also punishable 
by fine or imprisonment.377 Life imprisonment and even the death penal-
ty are available sanctions if the death of any person results from the ac-
tivity.378 
Like the Anti-Piracy Statute, and pursuant to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the SUA statute enacted by the United States has far 
reaching jurisdiction. The statute applies to activities committed by a 
U.S. national in U.S. territorial waters, as well as to acts committed 
against or on board a U.S.-flagged ship anywhere in the world.379 Juris-
diction also extends to any situation worldwide where a U.S. national is 
seized, threatened, injured, or killed, as well as to situations in which the 
offender is later found in the United States.380 The last option is particu-
larly relevant because it applies not only to persons who voluntarily find 
themselves in the United States, but also to persons who are extradited or 
rendered to the United States.381 Jurisdiction also extends to attacks on 
any vessel where the activity is undertaken to attempt to compel the 
United States to do or abstain from doing any act,382 which is a provision 
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intended to apply to piratical acts involving hostage taking or terrorism. 
Unfortunately, despite the overall wide sweep of this statute, it appears to 
have been used only once in U.S. courts,383 though its use resulted in a 
successful conviction.384 
The United States has similarly codified the key provisions of the 
Hostage Taking Convention into U.S. law.385 This statute deems hostage 
taking to be a criminal offense punishable with a life sentence or by 
death if a hostage is killed.386 The prohibition extends to hostage taking 
outside the United States if the hostage or the hostage takers are U.S. 
nationals, the offenders are found in the United States, or the hostage 
takers are seeking to compel action by the U.S. government.387  
All of these alternate statutes differ significantly from the Anti-
Piracy Statute in one key way. While the above statutes provide the 
United States with considerable jurisdictional reach, only the crime of 
piracy has universal jurisdiction.388 Thus, unless the Anti-Piracy Statute 
applies to a given situation, the United States might not be able to prose-
cute individuals engaging in seemingly piratical activities if such activi-
ties lack a sufficient nexus with the United States. Fortunately, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that actions in violation of the SUA at least are consid-
ered forms of piracy, and that consequently the United States can utilize 
universal jurisdiction to convict individuals of violations of the U.S. stat-
ute enacting the SUA.389 
C. Prosecution Outside the United States 
Between the Anti-Piracy Statute and other criminal provisions, the 
United States has an impressive arsenal of legal options and an extensive 
jurisdictional reach that can be levied against pirates. As noted above, 
however, the United States often refrains from employing these tools for 
reasons that include cost, time delays, court congestion, and lack of prox-
imity of witnesses.390 Fortunately, the United States is rarely the sole na-
tion with jurisdiction over a crime of piracy because the attacked vessel 
may be flying under another nation’s flag, or the attack may have taken 
place within the sovereign waters of another country. In such cases, both 
the flag country and the country with territorial sovereignty are said to 
                                                 
 383. Kontorovich, supra note 29. 
 384. Lei Shi, 525 F.3d at 709. 
 385. United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 386. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006). 
 387. Id. § 1203(b)(1). 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 355–58. 
 389. Lei Shi, 525 F.3d at 722–24. 
 390. See supra text accompanying notes 318–19. 
2012] Maritime Piracy 115 
have concurrent jurisdiction.391 If there is a dispute over which nation has 
priority, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the “jurisdiction asserted 
by the sovereignty of the port must prevail over that of the vessel.”392 Of 
course, there may also be competing claims of jurisdiction from the na-
tion of the attackers and the nation of the victims, as well as any nation 
seeking to assert universal jurisdiction. 
As might be expected, the problem is rarely that too many nations 
seek jurisdiction to prosecute a given pirate, but rather that no nation is 
interested in prosecuting the pirate.393 Still, just as the United States has 
increased its prosecution of pirates in the past few years, so too have oth-
er nations. In June 2010, a Dutch court sentenced five Somali men to five 
years in prison for trying to hijack a Dutch Antilles-flagged cargo ship in 
the Gulf of Aden,394 described as the first modern piracy trial in Eu-
rope.395 In May 2010, a Yemen court sentenced six Somali pirates to 
death—and six others to ten-year jail sentences—for hijacking a Yemeni 
oil tanker.396 Seychelles sentenced eleven Somali pirates to ten years in 
prison in July 2010 for attempting to hijack a Seychelles coast guard 
ship.397 In February 2011, South Korea indicted five Somalis for attempt-
ed murder, hostage taking, and robbery related to the pirates’ seizure of 
the South Korean-operated Samho Jewelry.398 The captured pirates re-
ceived sentences ranging from twelve years to life imprisonment.399 Na-
tions as diverse as Germany, Mauritius, France, Somalia, Russia, and 
Spain have also prosecuted suspected pirates.400 Overall, almost twenty 
countries have recently initiated prosecutions against nearly 950 pi-
rates.401 
The United States and other nations have gone a step further and 
have sought to induce nations near Somalia to assert universal jurisdic-
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tion to prosecute pirates captured by U.S. and European forces, even 
though such third countries have absolutely no connection to the act, the 
attackers, or the victims. These prosecutions in local courts demonstrate 
a regional commitment to thwart the problem of piracy, as well as the 
ability of states to cooperate to address the issue.402 They also greatly 
reduce the prosecutorial costs and manpower on U.S. and European 
courts.403 The first such case took place in 2007.404 That case stemmed 
from the January 2006 assault against an Indian dhow, the Safina Al 
Bisarat. Using rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 assault rifles, ten 
Somali pirates overtook the dhow in international waters. Fortunately, 
the USS Winston S. Churchill happened to be in the vicinity and was able 
to recapture the dhow and detain the Somalis. After discussions among 
the relevant states, the pirates were transferred to Kenya for trial. Apply-
ing universal jurisdiction, the Kenyan court convicted and sentenced the 
pirates to seven years in prison.405 
Buoyed by that success, the United States and other countries sub-
sequently entered into memoranda of understanding with Kenya to send 
captured pirates to Kenya for prosecution.406 More than 100 alleged pi-
rates have been transferred to Kenya under this agreement.407 Of course, 
Kenya’s willingness to prosecute such pirates is not limitless, given the 
exceptional expense of such prosecutions, as well as domestic grumbling 
about why the relatively poor nation is expected to do the world’s dirty 
work.408 Indeed, in 2010, Kenya suspended its agreement to prosecute 
pirates.409 It later begrudgingly agreed to reconsider new prosecutions, 
but only after being reassured of additional financial support.410 Follow-
ing the Kenyan example, Seychelles is creating a U.N.-supported center 
to prosecute suspected pirates.411 Overall, it is expected that donor na-
tions will spend more than $9 million to support piracy trials in Kenya 
and Seychelles.412 Mauritania and Tanzania have also expressed an inter-
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est in becoming a destination for piracy trials,413 and the United Nations 
Security Council has urged additional nations to consider the same.414 
Of course, the United States and other nations need to be careful 
about entering into such agreements. The United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) precludes nations from turning a pirate over to a 
nation where it is more likely than not that the pirate would be tor-
tured.415 This provision has often deterred European nations, for exam-
ple, from turning pirates over to the Somali government.416 It could also 
affect the willingness of nations to turn pirates over to other countries 
with less than impeccable human rights records, even if it is unclear 
whether torture will ensue. It is important to note, however, that U.S. law 
with regard to the CAT does not actually prohibit transfer of a pirate to a 
nation where he or she may be tortured, though U.S. policy currently 
precludes such transfers.417 
There is also a question about whether such transfers of pirates to a 
third country violate Article 105 of UNCLOS III. That provision permits 
states to seize pirate ships on the high seas, but it provides that prosecu-
tion of seized pirates should be carried out by “the courts of the state 
which carried out the seizure.”418 The drafting history of Article 105 in-
dicates that it was intended to prevent transfers of pirates to third parties 
for prosecution.419 However, such a restriction contradicts pre-UNCLOS 
III customary international law that clearly permitted such transfers to 
third countries.420 
While no case has explored whether the transfer of a pirate from a 
capturing country to a third country actually violates the terms of 
UNCLOS III,421 a variety of states routinely transfer pirates to third na-
tions.422 This indicates an implicit assessment by the international com-
munity that either Article 105 does not preclude such transfers or the pre-
existing customary international law permitting such transfers survived 
Article 105.423 This would appear to be an appropriate result because pi-
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rates are subject to universal jurisdiction.424 If any nation can prosecute 
pirates, why should the capturing nation be the only one permitted to do 
so? Further, if international law did preclude the transfer of pirates to a 
third nation, then states might merely respond by having the capturing 
nation “release” pirates near the prosecuting nation’s port or military 
vessel, with the latter then “re-capturing” the pirates under universal ju-
risdiction and proceeding with the prosecution. No legitimate purpose is 
served by having states engage in such legal contortions. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR AUGMENTING THE U.S. FIGHT AGAINST PIRACY 
As Part V illustrates, the United States possesses numerous legal 
options to combat piracy. But the actual U.S. effort thus far has been fair-
ly limited. Though its naval ships patrol the oceans around Somalia, the 
U.S., as well as other nations patrolling such waters, uses a strategy of 
mostly passive deterrence. Pirates may be attacked if they first attack a 
vessel in the region, but more likely, once the pirates’ plans are thwarted, 
the pirates are allowed to escape without any major ramifications. As a 
result, there is little financial or other deterrence against piracy, especial-
ly compared with the potential financial gain to the local, often impover-
ished, populace. This has led to a tremendous increase in pirate attacks, 
with no resolution in sight. The United States has numerous other press-
ing concerns for its time, focus, and funding (for example, rebuilding 
Iraq and Afghanistan, addressing the national debt, and mitigating turbu-
lence in the Middle East). But the current U.S. approach to maritime pi-
racy creates the opportunity for disaster—more pirate attacks on U.S. and 
other nations’ vessels, further deaths, extensive interruption of interna-
tional trade, potential ecological mayhem, and possibly horrific terrorist 
acts. 
To contend with this national security problem, the United States 
needs to consider several potential solutions. Possible solutions involving 
changes in U.S. geopolitics or diplomacy are beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, numerous changes could be made on the legal front, 
which, if implemented, would help reduce the threat posed by piracy. 
A. Increase U.S. Prosecutions 
Various commentators have asserted that the minimal threat of 
prosecution contributes to the escalation of piratical attacks.425 As one 
author has noted, “[p]rosecution is the weakest link in the current inter-
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national effort to combat piracy.”426 The head of one of Norway’s biggest 
shipping companies recently suggested that pirate ships should be fired 
upon and sunk, and captured pirates should be punished by death on the 
spot.427 As the shipping executive stated, “[w]hen [piracy] implies a great 
risk of being caught and hanged, and the cost of losing ships and weap-
ons becomes too big, it will decrease and eventually disappear.”428 While 
such a proposal is a bit over-the-top, the concept of deterrence has validi-
ty. When the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia togeth-
er began more actively prosecuting pirates, piratical attacks in that region 
plummeted.429 
To emulate that result worldwide, the United States first needs to 
become much more aggressive in prosecuting pirates. One way to do that 
would be to devote more prosecutorial resources toward piracy trials. 
Laws could also be enacted that would expand the scope of cases that 
can be brought against those who assist pirates. The Patriot Act created a 
criminal statute precluding material support to terrorism,430 which is in-
terpreted extremely broadly to effectively forbid virtually any support to 
terrorists.431 It has proven exceptionally helpful to prosecutors.432 Indeed, 
a 2009 Human Rights First Report found the most common charge 
brought in terrorism cases since 9/11 has been for a material support to 
terrorism, and such charges yielded the most convictions.433 In the piracy 
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realm, the U.S. government has already issued policy guidance noting 
the government’s desire to disrupt pirates’ financial backing, as well as 
the suppliers of their fuel, outboard motors, ladders, and other sup-
plies.434 In order to effectuate this goal, the United States should enact a 
material-support-to-piracy statute, which would allow U.S. prosecutors 
to bring claims against anyone in the chain of piracy.435 
B. Increase International Prosecutions 
Piracy is an international dilemma and, though it significantly im-
pacts U.S. national security, it is imperative that other nations also step 
up enforcement of anti-piracy laws. Terrorism is a U.S. national security 
matter, but terrorism is most effectively combatted when the internation-
al community realizes the threat it poses to all society and joins forces in 
the effort. The same is true of piracy. 
One problem is the lack of prosecutions of pirates by foreign na-
tions. Many nations engage in a capture-and-release policy, rather than a 
prosecute-and-convict policy because of a lack of political will and fi-
nancial cost.436 However, part of the problem stems from the fact that 
piracy prosecutions are based on national laws and many countries have 
weak national anti-piracy laws.437 Therefore, the United States should 
continue its policy of encouraging key nations, especially those most 
plagued by piracy, to ratify the SUA.438 The United States should also 
push countries that have ratified the SUA to enact stronger anti-piracy 
statutes, and to then actually prosecute pirates under those laws. 
The United States can also continue to establish agreements with 
third countries for their assistance in piracy prosecutions, as has already 
been done with Kenya and Seychelles.439 This would allow for prosecu-
tions close to the regions where most pirate attacks occur, making it easi-
er to bring pirates and witnesses before the court. Having the trial proxi-
mate to the location of most of the aggressors would also likely increase 
the deterrence value. Moreover, trials conducted by local African courts 
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would help diminish the perception that piracy in the region is mostly an 
American and European problem. 
The U.S. government and others have also recommended the crea-
tion of a special tribunal focused exclusively on piracy.440 However, 
creation of such a court faces the hurdles of gaining financing, support 
from nations, and the time needed to create a new tribunal.441 Rather than 
create a brand new tribunal, the international community should instead 
utilize a perfectly functioning one that already exists. As noted above in 
Part III, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to hear a 
number of criminal cases, but does not appear to have jurisdiction to hear 
piracy claims. Yet, given that piracy is a universal crime—a crime 
against all humanity—and thus clearly a “serious crime of concern” to 
the international community, the ICC would be the perfect mechanism to 
handle such claims. The ICC is already an established and well-
recognized entity even though the United States has yet to join it. It has a 
physical court as well as rules of procedure and case law in place. Final-
ly, the ICC would likely benefit by expanding its repertoire to include 
anti-piracy cases so as to establish itself as a court that can handle more 
than just politically explosive genocide and war crimes claims. There-
fore, the ICC’s jurisdiction should be interpreted or expanded to include 
trials for piracy. 
C. Create Better Mechanisms for Hot Pursuit 
As noted above, UNCLOS III does not permit the United States or 
other nations to pursue pirates into another nation’s territorial waters.442 
Pirates often use this limitation to evade capture by darting into territorial 
waters when chased.443 Indeed, there are numerous examples of pirates 
operating in the Strait of Malacca, a body of water that stretches between 
Indonesia and Malaysia, who employ a deliberate tactic of jumping in, 
out, and between Indonesian and Malaysian territorial waters to evade 
pursuit.444 This limit on hot pursuit greatly restricts the ability of the 
United States and other nations to capture pirates, prosecute them, and 
deter others from piratical attacks. 
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One solution would be to amend UNCLOS III to permit hot pursuit 
of pirates into another nation’s sovereign territory. Still, as noted above, 
the protection of sovereign territory goes to the very heart of the United 
Nations Charter445 and is quite frankly one of the most basic precepts 
behind the concept of a nation-state. Thus, it seems unlikely that nations 
would permit such an amendment of UNCLOS III. 
A better solution would be to follow the example of Somalia. The 
United Nations Security Council passed resolutions permitting nations to 
chase and capture pirates in Somali waters due to the blanket permission 
of the Somali government.446 Without going through the tedious task of 
seeking and acquiring Security Council resolutions with regard to other 
territorial waters, the United States could seek to reproduce the Somali 
model elsewhere by negotiating bilateral agreements on hot pursuit pro-
tocols with other countries experiencing significant piratical acts in their 
territorial seas. These agreements could authorize blanket approvals, 
though it is unlikely that most nations would accept such wide infringe-
ment of their sovereignty. Alternatively, the bilateral agreements could 
establish specific and efficient mechanisms for quickly acquiring permis-
sion to engage in hot pursuit of pirates into territorial waters on a case-
by-case basis. Either option, however, would enable more pirates to be 
apprehended and invoke a higher level of deterrence as pirates would 
lose one of their best mechanisms for evading capture. 
D. Allow Ships to Better Protect Themselves 
While prosecution offers one means of deterrence, another less ex-
pensive option is to make commercial vessels harder targets. The United 
States has already taken some steps to do this. The International Shipping 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), established at the urging of 
the United States and others, is intended to increase the security of the 
world’s commercial fleets by requiring ship operators, as well as the 
owners of large-scale port facilities, to develop useable security plans.447 
Through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA),448 
the United States implemented the ISPS Code into U.S. law.449 Under the 
MTSA’s provisions, foreign ports must become certified as meeting cer-
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tain security requirements before they can be used as a transit for ships 
destined for the United States.450 
Yet merely increasing port security is not enough. More needs to be 
done to induce and allow commercial vessels to protect themselves. 
Some shipping firms, on their own, have implemented on-board security 
systems by installing fire hoses, electric fences, barbed wire, bright 
lights, alarm systems, tracking devices, and even devices that emit ear-
splitting pulses toward a targeted area.451 Others have gone so far as to 
place weapons aboard their ships or hire private security companies to 
emplace armed personnel on vessels to protect the ship from pirate at-
tacks.452 
There are clear indications that vessels employing such defense sys-
tems have been extremely successful at staving off piracy.453 Indeed, the 
Maersk Alabama, discussed in the Introduction, provides anecdotal 
proof. Amazingly enough, pirates again attacked the Alabama off the 
Somali coast a mere seven months after the first attack.454 This time, 
however, the ship was better prepared, having installed anti-pirate struc-
tural features and safety equipment, as well as an armed security force.455 
The latter opened fire on the pirates and repelled the attack.456 Such suc-
cess stories, combined with the increased number of pirate attacks and 
the limited ability and willingness of the world’s navies to fully patrol 
the areas of danger, makes it almost inevitable that more private vessels 
will seek to obtain self-defense mechanisms.457 
To encourage such self-help measures, the United States advocates 
for all vessels to adopt best management practices to protect themselves 
from attack—including maintaining additional lookouts on watches and 
using closed circuit television cameras and razor wire.458 However, these 
best management practices do not include arming the crews of vessels.459 
Indeed, as noted in Part IV, the United States has actually implemented 
laws and regulations that greatly restrict U.S.-flagged ships from carry-
ing weapons that could be used to defend against pirate attacks. 
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The United States needs to change its policies in this area. There 
are legitimate concerns that untrained armed crews could fire upon inno-
cent civilians,460 that an arms race could ensue between the vessels and 
the pirates,461 or that vessels permitted to bring weapons on board could 
use such weapons to engage in arms smuggling. Nevertheless, the use of 
armed crews and guards has proved effective in deterring pirate attacks. 
The United States government has recognized that “not a single ship em-
ploying armed guards has been successfully pirated.”462 In fact, much of 
the recent success in thwarting piratical attacks has been attributed to the 
increase in private security personnel on ships.463 As the world’s navies 
cannot defend all ships everywhere on the high seas, and as piracy con-
tinues to be an extensive threat, vessels must be permitted to engage in 
sufficient self-help to protect themselves. Therefore, not only should the 
United States augment its best management practices to include arming 
of crews, but U.S. regulations should also be amended to permit, if not 
require, U.S.-flagged ships and ships using U.S. ports to purchase and 
maintain armaments for defensive purposes.464 
These regulations should not be open-ended. They should provide 
that vessels can possess only a limited number of weapons to preclude 
arms trafficking. The numbers and types of weapons permitted should be 
restricted only to those relevant for defending a ship from pirate attack 
and should vary based upon the type of ship and its planned itinerary—
cruise ships travelling a relatively benign path between Florida and the 
Caribbean would not need the same set of defenses as an oil tanker trav-
elling through the Gulf of Aden. All vessels should be required to main-
tain a detailed accounting of their weapons at all times to ensure that 
weapons do not go “missing.” The weapons would also need to be 
properly stored and maintained. Finally, only crew members properly 
trained on how and when to use the weapons should be permitted to em-
ploy the weapons; currently, there is no required training for crews or 
private security forces on board U.S. ships.465 Instituting these regula-
tions with the above limitations will allow U.S. vessels to defend them-
selves from attack. Equally important, it would give pirates notice that 
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these vessels are likely to carry these weapons without undermining the 
purpose of the original regulations to preclude arms trafficking.466 
Implementing such proposals will make pirates well aware that 
U.S.-flagged ships and ships using U.S. ports should not be trifled with. 
Of course, providing weapons to crews is not a universal panacea. Pirates 
might still decide that the benefit outweighs the risk. Also, arming crews 
increases the possibility of mutiny, accidental discharge, or weapons be-
ing confiscated and employed by passengers or the pirates. Further, other 
ports or territorial waters used by our ships may have restrictions on gun 
ownership, and authorities may believe the ship is engaged in weapons 
smuggling.467 Nonetheless, the value of arming vessels to deter piracy—
both in general and in specific instances of attacks—appears to outweigh 
these potential negatives. 
Self-help options beyond merely arming crews to stave off attacks 
should also be considered. For example, a ship’s crew should be permit-
ted to capture and seize attacking pirates. Citizen’s arrest rules in the 
United States generally permit a private citizen to arrest someone if the 
citizen has probable cause to believe that a felony has occurred or if the 
citizen witnesses a misdemeanor constituting a breach of the peace.468 
Such arrests do not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution 
because the arresting individual is not an employee of the U.S. govern-
ment.469 But the rules governing citizen’s arrests are promulgated on a 
state-by-state basis.470 It is therefore unclear whether citizen’s arrest rules 
apply overseas and if so, which state’s rules apply in a given overseas 
scenario. As such, a federal citizen’s arrest law, particularly in the area of 
combatting piracy given its universal approbation, would allow private 
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U.S.-flagged ships to capture and detain pirates without having to wait 
for a passing military vessel. U.S.-flagged ships would of course be re-
quired to promptly transfer captured pirates to the U.S. military or law 
enforcement personnel or to an appropriate court of law for prosecution. 
Finally, the United States could encourage U.S.-flagged vessels to 
bring civil suit against pirates and those that assist them in U.S. courts 
under theories of tort, attempted robbery, assault and battery, or any oth-
er civil cause of action. Even foreign-flagged vessels could be encour-
aged to bring civil claims in U.S. courts against pirates. The Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), for example, grants U.S. district courts “original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”471 Piracy is one of 
the laws of nations encompassed under the ATS.472 Encouraging civil 
suits in U.S. courts against pirates and those who assist them would be 
another mechanism for deterrence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Piracy is on the rise. Its actual and potential relationship to terror-
ism is unmistakable. While this nation laments not taking preventative 
action with regard to airplane hijacking prior to 9/11, it has an opportuni-
ty to avoid the same mistake in the realm of maritime piracy. The United 
States already has a number of mechanisms under international and 
American law to combat the threat, from immediate military and law 
enforcement action to longer-term prosecution both in the United States 
and abroad. U.S. policymakers have made additional pledges to engage 
in further deterrence efforts. 
But little will actually be done until the United States government 
and the American populace recognize piracy for what it truly is—a po-
tentially devastating national security matter. Once this realization is 
made—hopefully before a crippling pira-terrorist attack—the United 
States will then need to take important steps to address the issue. Many 
such steps fall within the political and military realm, and thus are be-
yond the scope of this Article. Numerous options for improvement, in-
cluding those offered in the prior section, exist in the legal arena, and 
must be seriously considered. 
Fortunately, piracy is one of the few crimes of universal jurisdiction 
in the world. This is due to the long-held, world-wide repugnance for the 
act, which negatively impacts commerce as well as law and order, and 
threatens the very concept of nationhood. Addressing this considerable 
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threat should receive bipartisan support, domestically and internationally. 
While one person’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter, it is diffi-
cult to envision the same sentiment toward pirates. This agreement on 
preventing piracy gives the United States a tremendous opportunity to 
work with the world community to take action now, before a real crisis 
erupts. Piracy is nearing a tipping point: it, and its association with ter-
rorism, is on the rise, but currently containable. The United States there-
fore needs to take appropriate steps to address this budding national se-
curity concern before it becomes a national security disaster. We first 
need to acknowledge the potential extent of the problem and then take 
concrete actions, such as those proposed in this Article, in order to begin 
to adequately address the impending threat. 
 
 
